The blog discusses current affairs and development of national economic and social health through unique idea generation. Consider the blog a type of thought experiment where ideas are generated to be pondered but should never be considered definitive as a final conclusion. It is just a pathway to understanding and one may equally reject as accept ideas as theoretical dribble. New perspectives, new opportunities, for a new generation. “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.”—Thomas Jefferson
Wednesday, March 3, 2021
1Q 2021 United States Expects Possible 10%+GDP Growth
The U.S. Economy is poised to grow at a whopping +10% GDP in the beginning of 2021 according to Atlanta Federal Reserve calculations. That is great news for those who believe the economy is ready to roar back to life once the doors open. This year is expected to be a great year as companies begin to open up to the public, adapt to the the Information Age (Digital Economy) and manufacturing/investment starts to gain momentum.
The calculation is derived from a running total called GDP Now that is managed by the Center of Quantitative Economic Research. Here is some information provided on who they are and the calculations they complete....
"The growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) is a key indicator of economic activity, but the official estimate is released with a delay. Our GDPNow forecasting model provides a "nowcast" of the official estimate prior to its release by estimating GDP growth using a methodology similar to the one used by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
GDPNow is not an official forecast of the Atlanta Fed. Rather, it is best viewed as a running estimate of real GDP growth based on available economic data for the current measured quarter. There are no subjective adjustments made to GDPNow—theestimate is based solely on the mathematical results of the model. (GDP Now, 2021)"
Raw calculations are important because hey state what is happening in the present without being filtered through hindsight. That "now" means that unless something big happens (i.e. illness, natural disaster, etc...) we will have an excellent start to the year. Their projections are....
A calculation I did in early 2020 on the impact of COVID |
"The GDPNow model estimate for real GDP growth (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the first quarter of 2021 is 10.0 percent on March 1, up from 8.8 percent on February 26. After this morning's Manufacturing ISM Report On Business from the Institute for Supply Management and the construction spending report from the U.S. Census Bureau, the nowcasts of first-quarter real personal consumption expenditures growth, first-quarter real gross private domestic investment growth, and first-quarter real government spending growth increased from 7.7 percent, 17.7 percent, and 6.9 percent, respectively, to 8.8 percent, 18.7 percent, and 9.1 percent, respectively."
GDP Contracts 1st Q of 2020-Is It a Short Lived Shock and Digital GDP Recovery? (April 30, 2020).
Theory of Transactional Clusters. Ongoing research since 2012
Bond Market Bubble? Former New York Federal Reserve President Bill Dudley Chimes In!
Bond markets are heating up and are likely to push up costs of other borrowing. If we need to press on the gas to push the economy to recover and then pull back we should expect higher bond yields 3-4% for perhaps 10 years. As economies rise the interest rates rise and the cost of borrowing increased. Bonds are often the fundamental source of inter-government lending and determine other costs in society and your household.
Tuesday, March 2, 2021
FBI director testifies on Capitol Riots: Opportunities for National Improvement in Thwarting Future Extremism
This is going to be interesting. Radical ideology can be anywhere. It can be overseas and it can be in the U.S.. We must change our lens and implement a new strategy if we are going to tackle this at its more fundamental levels (in our neighborhoods and towns). One of the problems is that national leadership seems to know all the answers without asking the right questions.
Ranking member Mr. Grassley indicates they need data on extremism information and percentages but there is no real way to track without coding the information properly for researchers to understand. Universal Justice means we use the same kind of lens for hate and extremist behaviors in general. Seeing Jihadist, White Supremist, or any other type of extremism has the same fundamental root causes.
I think FBI Director Christopher Wray did a pretty good job with is answer by indicating that the ideology encourages violence or breaks federal law they want to go after it. It is hard to turn raw intelligence into meaningful results quickly in a way that leads effective decision-making.One possible strategy Michigan could consider is to put in place a system of uncovering and labeling lower level way correctly...
Opportunities for Hate Crime Reform Michigan-Better Coding and Better Solutions
Sunday, February 28, 2021
Trump Speaks of CPAC-Change is Constant
Watching the political news and changes in the political scene as Trump reengages GOP after leaving office. The Republican party has been through a lot over the past year and there are questions as to where it is headed next (1 party or 2 parties?). It looks like an underlining crack in the party but whether that gets bigger or smaller depends on socio-political changes. I found this posting on socio-political changes to refresh my memory. If you read the preview page it has some cool ideas that put things into perspective of how change in society occurs. HERE.
The publication discusses patterns of society and its institutions (family, church, political, and economic). When one of them changes they will all change in some way. For example a change in family would impact political and economic aspects of life (Have you watched Game of Thrones? From a more scientific perspective, changing factor T influences B and visa versa.
Change is constant and change builds off of previous choices. We can project what may happen but we can't be 100% sure. Think of how society has changed in just the past 6 years and how the personalities and beliefs of key leaders influence large swaths of people. Ideas that tap into people's pre-existing beliefs create further alignment/agreement as ideas conceptually blend. There are many different types of power but....it is how we use that power that counts in defining ourselves (your character).
Smith, S. (1968). A Case Study on Socio-Political Change. Phylon (1960-), 29(4), 380-387. doi:10.2307/274023
Bi-Partisanship, Veterans and "For Country Caucus"?
Veterans are a motivated group who know the deeper meaning of patriotism. They have walked the talk and often come back home and would like to engage in their communities and government in a meaningful way. Bi-partisanship and the need for veterans to once again serve their country through pro-social and positive community growth and action. When given half a chance, many veterans continue to serve for lifetimes after service. As a group they can put their experiences and knowledge in creating national development policies.
| ||
Washington - The For Country Caucus, a group of Military Veterans serving in Congress and dedicated to working together to create a more productive government, announced new leadership and a growing caucus membership for the 117th Congress. A retired Lt. General in the Marine Corps, U.S. Representative Jack Bergman will join the Caucus for the 117th Congress. “With forty years serving in the United States Marines Corps and earning the rank of Lt. General, Congressman Jack Bergman is the highest-ranking combat Veteran to have ever served in the House of Representatives and I am honored to have him join the For Country Caucus. Rep. Bergman’s vast military experience will be a tremendous asset to our group,” said Republican Co-Chair of the For Country Caucus, Congressman Van Taylor. “I’m proud to be a member of the bipartisan For Country Caucus. Far too often the strong, bipartisan work done every day in D.C. is drowned out by the noise of partisan bickering. This caucus, comprised of men and women who have served in our Nation’s uniform, will continue to focus on policy to better our communities and country as whole,” said Rep. Bergman. Congressmen Van Taylor (R-TX-03) and Jared Golden (D-ME-02) will lead the caucus as co-chairs through 2022 as its ranks swell to 25 members. Congressmen Jim Baird (R-IN-04) and Salud Carbajal (D-CA-24) will serve as vice-chairs. “Serving this country in the military gives you the skills to work as a team with Americans of different backgrounds and beliefs, for a cause greater than yourself,” said co-chairs Van Taylor and Jared Golden. “As co-chairs of the For Country Caucus, we’re honored to lead this bipartisan group of Veterans as we continue to build on the foundation that’s been laid over the past two years. The mission of this caucus — to set aside political differences in the pursuit of policies that will benefit the country — has never been more important, and together we can set that example in Congress.” The For Country Caucus is a group of principled military Veteran members who strive to create a Congress that is less polarized, more efficient, and is trusted by Americans. Together, they share a vision of a Congress that is strategic in purpose, focused on action, and where elected officials put our country first. Members of the For Country Caucus seek a Congress where members serve with integrity, civility, and courage. Members of the 117th Congress For Country Caucus include Representatives Jason Crow (D-CO-06), Don Bacon (R-NE-02), Chrissy Houlahan (D-PA-06), Jack Bergman (R-MI-01), Scott Franklin (R-FL-15), Kai Kahele (D-HI-02), Mike Gallagher (R-WI-08), Mike Garcia (R-CA-25), Conor Lamb (D-PA-17), Tony Gonzales (R-TX-23), Adam Kinzinger (R-IL-16), Elaine Luria (D-VA-02), Brian Mast (R-FL-18), Peter Meijer (R-MI-03), Seth Moulton (D-MA-06), Mariannette Miller Meeks (R-IA-02), Jimmy Panetta (D-CA-20), August Pfluger (R-TX-11), Mikie Sherrill (D-NJ-11), Greg Steube (R-FL-17), and Michael Waltz (R-FL-06). In the 116th Congress, the For Country Caucus built a strong track record and got results. The caucus and its members successfully worked to pass a number of national service-oriented provisions into law, including:
|
Saturday, February 27, 2021
President Biden Signs Executive Orders on the Economy
Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. The United States needs resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains to ensure our economic prosperity and national security. Pandemics and other biological threats, cyber-attacks, climate shocks and extreme weather events, terrorist attacks, geopolitical and economic competition, and other conditions can reduce critical manufacturing capacity and the availability and integrity of critical goods, products, and services. Resilient American supply chains will revitalize and rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity, maintain America’s competitive edge in research and development, and create well-paying jobs. They will also support small businesses, promote prosperity, advance the fight against climate change, and encourage economic growth in communities of color and economically distressed areas.
More resilient supply chains are secure and diverse — facilitating greater domestic production, a range of supply, built-in redundancies, adequate stockpiles, safe and secure digital networks, and a world-class American manufacturing base and workforce. Moreover, close cooperation on resilient supply chains with allies and partners who share our values will foster collective economic and national security and strengthen the capacity to respond to international disasters and emergencies.
Therefore, it is the policy of my Administration to strengthen the resilience of America’s supply chains.
Sec. 2. Coordination. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (APEP) shall coordinate the executive branch actions necessary to implement this order through the interagency process identified in National Security Memorandum 2 of February 4, 2021 (Renewing the National Security Council System). In implementing this order, the heads of agencies should, as appropriate, consult outside stakeholders — such as those in industry, academia, non-governmental organizations, communities, labor unions, and State, local, and Tribal governments — in order to fulfill the policy identified in section 1 of this order.
Sec. 3. 100-Day Supply Chain Review. (a) To advance the policy described in section 1 of this order, the APNSA and the APEP, in coordination with the heads of appropriate agencies, as defined in section 6(a) of this order, shall complete a review of supply chain risks, as outlined in subsection (b) of this section, within 100 days of the date of this order.
(b) Within 100 days of the date of this order, the specified heads of agencies shall submit the following reports to the President, through the APNSA and the APEP:
(i) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging supply chains and policy recommendations to address these risks. The report shall include the items described in section 4(c) of this order.
(ii) The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the supply chain for high-capacity batteries, including electric-vehicle batteries, and policy recommendations to address these risks. The report shall include the items described in section 4(c) of this order.
(iii) The Secretary of Defense (as the National Defense Stockpile Manager), in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the supply chain for critical minerals and other identified strategic materials, including rare earth elements (as determined by the Secretary of Defense), and policy recommendations to address these risks. The report shall also describe and update work done pursuant to Executive Order 13953 of September 30, 2020 (Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries). The report shall include the items described in section 4(c) of this order.
(iv) The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the supply chain for pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients and policy recommendations to address these risks. The report shall complement the ongoing work to secure the supply chains of critical items needed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including personal protective equipment, conducted pursuant to Executive Order 14001 of January 21, 2021 (A Sustainable Public Health Supply Chain). The report shall include the items described in section 4(c) of this order.
(c) The APNSA and the APEP shall review the reports required under subsection (b) of this section and shall submit the reports to the President in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) The APNSA and the APEP shall include a cover memorandum to the set of reports submitted pursuant to this section, summarizing the reports’ findings and making any additional overall recommendations for addressing the risks to America’s supply chains, including the supply chains for the products identified in subsection (b) of this section.
Sec. 4. Sectoral Supply Chain Assessments. (a) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the specified heads of agencies shall submit the following reports to the President, through the APNSA and the APEP:
(i) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the defense industrial base that updates the report provided pursuant to Executive Order 13806 of July 21, 2017 (Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States), and builds on the Annual Industrial Capabilities Report mandated by the Congress pursuant to section 2504 of title 10, United States Code. The report shall identify areas where civilian supply chains are dependent upon competitor nations, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.
(ii) The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the public health and biological preparedness industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services). The report shall complement the work conducted pursuant to section 4 of Executive Order 14001.
(iii) The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for critical sectors and subsectors of the information and communications technology (ICT) industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security), including the industrial base for the development of ICT software, data, and associated services.
(iv) The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Energy).
(v) The Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the transportation industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Transportation).
(vi) The Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the production of agricultural commodities and food products.
(b) The APNSA and the APEP shall, as appropriate and in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, recommend adjustments to the scope for each industrial base assessment, including digital networks, services, assets, and data (“digital products”), goods, services, and materials that are relevant within more than one defined industrial base, and add new assessments, as appropriate, for goods and materials not included in the above industrial base assessments.
(c) Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall include a review of:
(i) the critical goods and materials, as defined in section 6(b) of this order, underlying the supply chain in question;
(ii) other essential goods and materials, as defined in section 6(d) of this order, underlying the supply chain in question, including digital products;
(iii) the manufacturing or other capabilities necessary to produce the materials identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section, including emerging capabilities;
(iv) the defense, intelligence, cyber, homeland security, health, climate, environmental, natural, market, economic, geopolitical, human-rights or forced-labor risks or other contingencies that may disrupt, strain, compromise, or eliminate the supply chain — including risks posed by supply chains’ reliance on digital products that may be vulnerable to failures or exploitation, and risks resulting from the elimination of, or failure to develop domestically, the capabilities identified in subsection (c)(iii) of this section — and that are sufficiently likely to arise so as to require reasonable preparation for their occurrence;
(v) the resilience and capacity of American manufacturing supply chains and the industrial and agricultural base — whether civilian or defense — of the United States to support national and economic security, emergency preparedness, and the policy identified in section 1 of this order, in the event any of the contingencies identified in subsection (c)(iv) of this section occurs, including an assessment of:
(A) the manufacturing or other needed capacities of the United States, including the ability to modernize to meet future needs;
(B) gaps in domestic manufacturing capabilities, including nonexistent, extinct, threatened, or single-point-of-failure capabilities;
(C) supply chains with a single point of failure, single or dual suppliers, or limited resilience, especially for subcontractors, as defined by section 44.101 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations (Federal Acquisition Regulation);
(D) the location of key manufacturing and production assets, with any significant risks identified in subsection (c)(iv) of this section posed by the assets’ physical location;
(E) exclusive or dominant supply of critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section, by or through nations that are, or are likely to become, unfriendly or unstable;
(F) the availability of substitutes or alternative sources for critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section;
(G) current domestic education and manufacturing workforce skills for the relevant sector and identified gaps, opportunities, and potential best practices in meeting the future workforce needs for the relevant sector;
(H) the need for research and development capacity to sustain leadership in the development of critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section;
(I) the role of transportation systems in supporting existing supply chains and risks associated with those transportation systems; and
(J) the risks posed by climate change to the availability, production, or transportation of critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section.
(vi) allied and partner actions, including whether United States allies and partners have also identified and prioritized the critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section, and possible avenues for international engagement. In assessing these allied and partner actions, the heads of agencies shall consult with the Secretary of State;
(vii) the primary causes of risks for any aspect of the relevant industrial base and supply chains assessed as vulnerable pursuant to subsection (c)(v) of this section;
(viii) a prioritization of the critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, including digital products, identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section for the purpose of identifying options and policy recommendations. The prioritization shall be based on statutory or regulatory requirements; importance to national security, emergency preparedness, and the policy set forth in section 1 of this order; and the review conducted pursuant to subsection (c)(v) of this section;
(ix) specific policy recommendations for ensuring a resilient supply chain for the sector. Such recommendations may include sustainably reshoring supply chains and developing domestic supplies, cooperating with allies and partners to identify alternative supply chains, building redundancy into domestic supply chains, ensuring and enlarging stockpiles, developing workforce capabilities, enhancing access to financing, expanding research and development to broaden supply chains, addressing risks due to vulnerabilities in digital products relied on by supply chains, addressing risks posed by climate change, and any other recommendations;
(x) any executive, legislative, regulatory, and policy changes and any other actions to strengthen the capabilities identified in subsection (c)(iii) of this section, and to prevent, avoid, or prepare for any of the contingencies identified in subsection (c)(iv) of this section; and
(xi) proposals for improving the Government-wide effort to strengthen supply chains, including proposals for coordinating actions required under this order with ongoing efforts that could be considered duplicative of the work of this order or with existing Government mechanisms that could be used to implement this order in a more effective manner.
(d) The APNSA and the APEP shall review the reports required under subsection (a) of this section and shall submit the reports to the President in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Sec. 5. General Review and Recommendations. As soon as practicable following the submission of the reports required under section 4 of this order, the APNSA and the APEP, in coordination with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall provide to the President one or more reports reviewing the actions taken over the previous year and making recommendations concerning:
(a) steps to strengthen the resilience of America’s supply chains;
(b) reforms needed to make supply chain analyses and actions more effective, including statutory, regulatory, procedural, and institutional design changes. The report shall include recommendations on whether additional offices, personnel, resources, statistical data, or authorities are needed;
(c) establishment of a quadrennial supply chain review, including processes and timelines regarding ongoing data gathering and supply chain monitoring;
(d) diplomatic, economic, security, trade policy, informational, and other actions that can successfully engage allies and partners to strengthen supply chains jointly or in coordination;
(e) insulating supply chain analyses and actions from conflicts of interest, corruption, or the appearance of impropriety, to ensure integrity and public confidence in supply chain analyses;
(f) reforms to domestic and international trade rules and agreements needed to support supply chain resilience, security, diversity, and strength;
(g) education and workforce reforms needed to strengthen the domestic industrial base;
(h) steps to ensure that the Government’s supply chain policy supports small businesses, prevents monopolization, considers climate and other environmental impacts, encourages economic growth in communities of color and economically distressed areas, and ensures geographic dispersal of economic activity across all regions of the United States; and
(i) Federal incentives and any amendments to Federal procurement regulations that may be necessary to attract and retain investments in critical goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as defined in sections 6(b) and 6(d) of this order, including any new programs that could encourage both domestic and foreign investment in critical goods and materials.
Sec. 6. Definitions. For purposes of this order:
(a) “Agency” means any authority of the United States that is an “agency” under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5). “Agency” also means any component of the Executive Office of the President.
(b) “Critical goods and materials” means goods and raw materials currently defined under statute or regulation as “critical” materials, technologies, or infrastructure.
(c) “Critical minerals” has the meaning given to that term in Executive Order 13953 of September 30, 2020 (Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries).
(d) “Other essential goods and materials” means goods and materials that are essential to national and economic security, emergency preparedness, or to advance the policy set forth in section 1 of this order, but not included within the definition of “critical goods and materials.”
(e) “Supply chain,” when used with reference to minerals, includes the exploration, mining, concentration, separation, alloying, recycling, and reprocessing of minerals.
Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.