As a human species we develop our
political views with those around us who help shape our experiences, motives
and attitudes through approval, information, and advice (Levitan & Visser, 2009). Openness to persuasion
depends on those who are immediately around us. The majority of people use
others to evaluate and define their own beliefs and opinions.
When issues of morality come to
the forefront of conscious people become more convinced of the rightness of their assumptions. Such people
are less tolerant of those who disagree with them (Skitka et al, 2005) and
become further beyond the influence of others outside their social networks. They
double down on their convictions and begin to avoid those who disagree.
This avoidance further puts them
on a particular stream of consciousness that seeks out confirming information
while ignoring dis confirming information. The more alienated a person becomes
from those who disagree the more they lack critical thinking skills to counter
their perspectives. There is a natural push to confirm one’s morality through
creating identifiable networks with similar beliefs.
Morality is open to general
debate about its origin and make up. Some believe that morality arises from
pure emotion that is independent of reason (Hume, 1739). Morality can also be
seen as pure reason without including emotion (Kant, 1785). Evidence has
supported the concept that morality is a dual process conceptualization where
both emotion and cognitive assessments create moral judgments (Ben-Nun Bloom,
2009).
In all cases morality is a
conclusion. It is a conclusion about how things should be and for what reason
they exist. Using critical thinking and seeing multiple perspectives in any
moral question brings out the ability to use both emotion and cognition to
determine the “rightness” or “wrongness” of one’s conclusions. Those that are
able to evaluate themselves and those within their networks can avoid the
perils of group think and limited perspective.
A study conducted by Bloom and
Levitan (2011) used 145 undergraduates from Stony Brook University which
exposed students to two politically divisive issues. The study explored moral
versus non-moral decision making as well as the heterogeneity of a person’s
social network. In the study the students were first asked about their moral
presumptions and their social networks. Once cued with messages they were asked
to re-evaluate to see if there were any differences.
Results:
-Association of social network
heterogeneity and morality condition.
-Three-way interaction between
religiosity, network heterogeneity, and morality condition.
-Network composition and morality is valid across
ideologies and different levels of moral conviction.
-When primed to think about morality issues
disagreeing members were viewed less warmly when compared to when morality questions were not
invoked.
-Moral issues create a belief system that one is
closer to their network.
Analysis:
Morality is a social affair. When issues are not
morally divisive people are willing to accept alternative explanations.
However, when issues become more morally associated levels of alternative
explanations are selected out. Those who hold varying points of view are seen
as more different while those who hold the same beliefs are seen as more alike.
People use their social networks to validate their beliefs and gravitate to
those social networks that support their beliefs. Encampment is created as
people separate themselves out into their particular social networks to
validate their experiences and beliefs.
Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2009b). The
moral public: Disgust, harm, and moral judgment. Paper presented at the meeting
of the International Society of Political Psychology, Dublin, Ireland.
Bloom, P. & Levitan, L. (2011). We’re closer
than I thought: social network heterogeneity, morality, and political
persuasion. Political Psychology, 32
(4).
Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of
human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Original work published in
1739).
Kant, I. (2002). The
groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Original
work published in 1785).
Levitan, L. C., & Visser, P.
S. (2008). The impact of the social context on resistance to persuasion: Effortful
versus effortless responses to counter-attitudinal information. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 640–649.
Skitka, L. Bauman, C., &
Sargis, E. (2005). Moral conviction: Another contributor to attitude strength
or something more? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 895–917.
